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2° Le voilier ayant ete detruit pour les Inotifs ci-dessus
in diques, il n 'y a lieu d 'en attribuer la valeur;
3° La somme representant la valeur de 10 tonnes
d 'orge, de 50 bidons d 'huile et de beurre et de 11 sacs
de farine remis par le capteur au consul de France a
Alexandrie, sera attribuee aux ayants droit, conformement aux lois et reglements en vigueur.
Delibere a Paris, dans la seance du 29 novembre 1915,
ou siegeaient: MM. Mayniel, president, Rene Worms,
Fuzier, Fromageot et de Ramey de Sugny, membres
du Conseil, en presence de M. Chardenet, commissaire
du Gouvernement.
En foi de quoi, la presente decision a ete signee par
le President, le Rapporteur et le Secretaire-greffier.
Signe ala minute:
E. MAYNIEL, pres·ident;
FuziER, rapporteurJ·
G. RAAB n'O:ERRY, secretaire-grejfier.
Pour expedition conforme:
Le Secre taire-greffier,
G. RAAB n'O:ERRY.
Vu par nous, Commissaire du Gouvernement,

p.

CHARDENET.

THE " INDIAN PRINCE."
February 17, 1916.
I Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts, 87.

In the prize matter concerning the English steamer
Indian Prince, Newcastle her home port, the imperial
superior prize court in Berlin, in virtue of the proceedings
of its sitting of February 17, 1916, has found as follows:
"The appeals from the decision of the Prize Court in
Hamburg, July 3, 1915, are refused."

Decision .

REASONS.

On September 4, 1914, the English steamer Indian th~t:~:~ent or
Prince, with sundry merchandise on board, and on the
way from Santos by way of Trinidad, to ports of the
United States of North America, at 7° south and 31°
west, was brought to by a German 'var vessel, and, in
view of the fact that the taking of the prize to port wa<s impossible, was sunk on September 9, after passengers and
crew had left the ship. The steamer 'vas the property
of the Prince Line (Ltd.), N e'vcastle.
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Upon the announcement on the part of the imperial
prize court in Ha1nburg, 30 parties interested in the cargo
presented claims for compensation for damages for 37
shipments that "\Vere destroyed.
'fhe court has confined the matter to the sole question
forCompensation
damage to
~f~~ral merchan- as to \Vhether or not compensation for damages for
neutral lnerchandise that was on board an enemy ship
and sunk along \Vith the latter must be made, and has
found as follows:
''Both the ship and the cargo that were sunk were
subject to seizure. The claims from 1 to 10, from 12 to
36, and 38 are refused as being unfounded."
'fhe plaintiffs have appealed from the decision of the
prize court as regards Nos. 2 to 10, 12 to 26, and 38.
The appeal had to be refused~
In the prize matter of the Glitra the competent court
has decided that when an enemy prize is lawfully destroyed, neutral merchandise found on board such enemy
ship and destroyed along with her is not entitled to
claim compensation for damages. This decision is to be
follo'v~d with regard to the contrary assertions made in
the present case.
Ger~an prize
From bo-enerally ..accepted
principles ' no such right can
re-gulatiOns.
.
be deduced, because the itct through "\vhich the cargo \Vas
ruined is not unla,vful, but is, on the contrary, lawful. Nor
has a right been established to compensation for damages
by any positive provision of the prize regulations. This
applies also to article 110 of the prize regulations together
\vith article 8 of the same, to "\vhich the plaintiffs have
referred. For however correct in itself the conclusion
may be, if the captain is not authorized even to take
neutral1nerchandise from an enemy ship in order to make
use of it, he may by no means do so in order to destroy
it 'vithout using it, this fact is in itself no help in the con-·
sideration of the question with which \Ve are dealing.
'fhe question we are here considering is as to whether or
Lawtuldestruc.. not, in accordance with international law, the commander
t ion.
is obligated to refrain from the la,vful destruction of an
enen1y ship 1nerely for the purpose of not destroying at
the same tune neutral lnerchandise on board such ship,
and in particular, as to \vhether or not he is obligated
thereto \Vhen it is impossible to take the ship to port.
After having repeatedly considered the question, the
competent court must hold to a denial of such obligation.
In this connection one need only 1na.ke reference to the pre-
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vious statement of justification. In particular, it is not
eorrect that the said decision \Vas based upon the ground
that the shippers, by lading their merchandise on an
enemy ship, had assumed the risk of seizure and destruction and, therefore, '\Vere not entitled to compensation. 53
On the contrary, in that decision, the idea that. the
neutral was free to expose or not to expose his lnerchaudise on board the enemr ship and to the dangers connected
there,vith \Vas considered only in a general way; and that
for the purpose of showing that the refusal of an indeinnification "\\-'"as not only obligatory from a purely legal
point of vie,v, but t.hat it. could not be regarded as unfair.
The essential reason for that decision, as \Vell as for the cargo.
(lecision in the present case is found in the actual dependence of the cargo on the fate of the ship by reason
of \vhich the cargo must bear the loss arising from the
exercise of a prize measure which is justifiably taken with
regard to the ship. It can not be seen "\\-..hy this generally
accepted principle, \Vhich is also unreservedly accepted
in the memoir to article 64 of the London declaration.· LDecdlaration
of
on on.
should only apply in case of capture and not like,vise in
case of the justified destruction of a ship.
The only question, therefore, that arises is as to 'vhether p~~~Y~ri~w~~~
or not the co1nmercial treaty bet.,veen Prussia anrl the R~~~ed Statu'
United States of North America offers a basis for the
claim of the plaintiffs. 1'his also n1ust be denied.
1"he provisions of the said treaty 'vith Prussia must, in
view of the practice 'vhich has been eonfirmed tnutually
not only during the present war, but likew·ise in previous
instances, be con~idered as governing the relations existing bet\veen the German Empire and the lJniterl States;
materially, ho\vever~ nothing arises fro1n the treaty in
favor of the plaintiffs.
A.ccording to A.rticle XII of the treaty of 1828 \Ye are
only to consider Articles XII and XIII of the earlier
treaties of 1785 and 1799, and A.rticle XII in the original
text of the treaty of 1785.
In this Article XII the 1egal principle "free ship. free " Fr~ ship, !ree
, .
d
"i:tT}
•
•
.
goods.
goo d s Is agree upon. v' 1ereas In treaties 'vh1ch the
United States concluded about the sa1ne time 'vith other
States there is found beside this provision the principle
reading "enemy ship, enemy goods," whereby an ex~ 3 The plaintiffs have asserted that this viewpoint does not apply here, because the
loading had taken place o•.cn before the outbreak o!thP war.
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ception is made only for merchandise which 'vas unloaded
before the outbreak of the \var or 'vithin a definite period after the outbreak, the treaty with Prussia is silent
as regards this matter, and there might be doubt as
t o ho\v \Ve are to understand that fact. Prussia may, indeed~ have taken the standpoint that neutralinerchandise, even on board an enemy ship, should not be subject to seizure. This may, indeed, be presumed if for
no other reason than that not long thereafter the same
fundan1ental prineiple \Vas recognized in the Prussian
statute book. Furthermore, in the course of the negotiations that led to the treaty of 1785 Prussia had expressed
the desire --,vhereto the plaintiffs appropriately referthat instead of the expression proposed in the Aineri~an outline, "enemy ship, ene1ny goods" there should
be put the contrary idea, "enemy ship, free goods." But
the United States did not accept the proposition, and
therefore nothing has been stipulated in regard to this
point. Thereby the legal condition as provided by the
treaty corresponded to that which had been sought for
by the ''armed neutrality" of 1780. In the latter's text
only the rule "free ship, free goods" found expression,
'\vhile nothing was said therein with regard to neutral
merchandise on board an enemy ship. From many
sources, however, this has been interpreted to the effect
that no resistance would be attempted against the seiz-.
ure of neutral merchandise on board an enemy ship. ''By
long practice it had become the custom to regard the confiscation of neutral merchandise on board enemy ships as
a concession made to the belligerent in order that the
latter might recognize the inviolability of enemy Inerchandise on board neutral ships."
[Cauchy, Le Droit Maritime International, Vol. II, p. 262.)

Treaty of1785.

Now, it is this standpoint which the official authorities
of the United States of North America took when interpreting the treaty of 1785 at the time when it was still
in force. No less a man than the Secretary of State,
Jefferson, \vho had had a personal part in the conclusion
of the treaty of 1785, expressed himself to that end
when in 1793 France, who was then at \Var \Vith Englandr
made complaint to the United States to the effect that
England was seizing French merchandise carried in American ships, and that the United States did not make objection. In the note of Jefferson, dated July 24, 1793, by
which the complaint was refused as unfounded, because ac-
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cording to the general law of nations (Consolato del mar)
enemy merchandise on board a neutral ship was subject
to seizure, which could be modified only in case ''free
ship, free goods" were agreed upon by treaty, we find
these words:
We have adopted this modification in our treaties with France, the J e tr e r son ' s
.
note.
Netherlands and Prussia, and, therefore, as to them, our vessels carry
the goods of their enemies, and we lose our goods, when in the 1,~ essels of
their enemies.

Although in the treaty with Prussia only ths principle
''free ship, free goods" was established, yet the Secretary of State, Jefferson, assumes that in accordance
therewith, the principle" enemy ship, enemy goods'' applied
automatically with regard to Prussia.
The claimants, therefore, do not appeal to Article XII
either, but to Article XIII of the treaties of 1785 and
1799. They do not deny that even from this article
nothing can be gained by them in favor of their standpoint in case the French text of the treaty is considered.
But they want to hold to the English text which evidences a change from which they believe they can draw
the conclusion that, in all cases where merchandise of
nationals of the United States of America is concerned,
even if the cargo is on board an enemy ship, indemnification must be paid.
We need not consider which of the two texts is the
authoritative one, nor need we consider how, in case
both are authoritative, a contradiction between the two
might be cleared up. For, not even the English text
yields any results favorable to the plaintiffs. Their view
is, in the first place, controverted because it is in direct
contradiction with the interpretation which the Government of the United States, as has already been shown,
gave to it in 1793.
Furthermore~ even from a purely linguistic point of
view, the interpretation of the English text as given by
the plaintiffs, is not admissible. While the French text
deals with merchandise that is laden:
" . .7\. bord des vaisseaux des sujets ou citoyens de l'une
des Parties,"
we read, on the contrary, in the English text,, not as it
should read in literal agreement: Carried in the vessels of
the subjects or citizens of either party, but ''Carried
in the vessels or by the subjects or citizens of either
party.''

Texts or treaty..
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Thereby, according to the plaintiffs, there comes under
the protection of Article XIII merchandise that is shipped in American or Prussian ships, as well as merchandise that is shipped by American or Prussian nationalsin no matter 'vhat kind of ships, and, hence, also in
enemy ships,-,vhich, so it is asserted, is equivalent to
merchandise that belongs to such nationals.
But the latter idea finds no expression in the treaty.
'Transportation ." Carried by" does not refer to property relationship,
but to the personality of him who undertakes the transportation. That, however, is the ship-owner, and not the
consignor or consignee. The entire departure of the
English text from the French text, therefore, amounts
to an extension of the English text, to the effect that
besides the ships of both nationals there are expressly
named, and that in the first place, the ships of the
parties to the treaty themselves, that is to say, the public
ships-" the vessels of either party." For the words "of
either party" must also be applied to'' in the vessels," if
any meaning at all is to be given to the latter expression.
·It is significant, that in the French text as found in
Martens, Recueil des Traites, Supplement, II, page 226,
which reprints the edition of the treaty prepared by the
imperial office of the interior, and which, unmistakably,
presents an independent translation from the English
made soon after the conclusion of the treaty of 1799, the
translator has reproduced the passage in exactly this
sense. The expression ''elles memes'' in the form '' ou
d'elles memes" can, for grammatical reasons, refer only
to the "parties contractantes" in whose own ships the
merchandise is being conveyed.
But, from material grounds as 'veil, another interpretation is not possible.
-contraband.
Article XIII deals with contraband. 'l'o 1neet the controversies that are usually connected 'vith the question
as to 'vhether or not merchandise is contraband, agreement is made that even contraband shall not be subject
to seizure; in case of need it may indeed be requisitioned
upon payment of its value; if the military situation so
demands, it 1nay even be seized temporarily, but even
so only by co1npensation made for the damage thereby
accruing to the shipper. These provisions of Article
XIII are most closely connected 'vith tha.t which is
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agreed upon in Article XII. .A. s, in a general way, contraband is always excepted from the principle "free ship:
free goods" so in this case, after that principle is established in Article XII for enemy merchandise in Prussian
or American ships, the exceptional case is taken up in
Article XIII \vhen the merchandise on board those ships
is of contraband nature or suspected of being contraband.
That this is indeed 1neant is indicated by the provision
regarding the treatment of the particular ship, by which
the captain 'vho undertakes to convey contraband to the
enemy shall be free to surrender such contraband in
order that he Inay thereafter continue his journey unmolested. Unmistakably in this connection only the
ships of the contracting parties 'vere under consideration.
It seems absolutely out of the question that the matter
agreed upon should also have been intended to cover the
case of an enemy ship conveying 'veapons, ammunition,
etc., to her own military forces. It can not have been
the intention that the belligerent party which succeeds in
capturing ttn enemy ship carrying weapons and ammunition, should be obligated to make compensation therefor in case it was a national of the other contracting
State who caused the transportation of the \Veapons to the
enemy, or that the enemy ship in case it has surrendered
the contraband, 1night continue her trip unmolested.
Accordingly, if Article XIII of the treaty of 1799 does
not refer to contraband on board enemy ships, it goes
without saying that nothing can be deduced from it as
regards the treatment of innocent merchandise on board
such ships. The principle ''enemyship, free goods" is, no'v
of course, also valid with regard to the United States, but
its validity does not rest upon any special conventional
provision, but only upon general internationalla'v as it
has been recognized in the declaration of Paris of 1856
and as applicable, according to the German prize regulations, even to countries \vhich, like the United States,
have not adhered to that deciaration. With rega1~d,
therefore, to the question 'vhether in circumstances
like those no'v under discussion, indemnification is to be
made to the o'vners of neutral 1nerchandise, only the
same principles that apply to the nationals of other
neutral countries can apply to the nationals of the United
States. These principles have been recorded in the decision regarding the Glitra.
5965Q-24--9
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